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Abstract: Prior studies show that equity value has convex relations with earnings and book 
value of equity, respectively, due to growth and adaptation options (Burgstahler and Dichev 
1997a; Zhang 2000). These studies, however, do not consider the role of institutions in 
affecting firms’ ability to exercise growth and adaptation options. In this study, we 
investigate whether these convex relations vary with the degree of a country’s economic 
freedom, which may influence the frictions and costs of exercising these options. We develop 
four hypotheses: In countries with greater economic freedom, (1) a firm’s capital investment 
in response to profitability is greater; (2) the relation between equity value and earnings, 
given equity book value, is more convex; (3) the relation between equity value and equity 
book value, given earnings, is more convex; and (4) the relation between stock return and 
profitability change is more convex. Using the index of economic freedom from the Fraser 
Institute, we test our hypotheses with data from 30 countries during the 2000–2010 period. 
The empirical results are consistent with these hypotheses. The effect of economic freedom 
that we document is distinct from the effects of GDP level and growth, legal origin, law 
enforcement, investor protection, and quality of accounting standards. Our results suggest 
that greater economic freedom enhances equity value through more efficient management of 
investment options.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Prior studies show that equity value has convex relations with earnings and book value 
of equity due to firms’ growth and adaptation opportunities (Berger et al. 1996; Burgstahler 
and Dichev 1997a; Zhang 2000; Biddle et al. 2001; Hao et al. 2011). This real-options-based 
approach to valuation provides insights into the role of active management in value creation. 
Previous studies, however, take firms’ ability to exercise such options for granted. More 
realistically, unlike financial options, the frictions and costs of exercising real options are 
non-trivial and therefore may limit firms’ ability to respond to potential investment 
opportunities and negatively affect equity value. This suggests that economic environments 
that provide firms with greater freedom to make investment decisions enhance the firms’ 
equity value attributable to real options. In this study, we investigate the effect of the extent 
of a country’s economic freedom on firms’ investment flexibility and equity value that are 
attributable to growth/adaptation options. 
Economic freedom refers to the degree to which a jurisdiction’s policies and 
institutions protect the rights of corporations and individuals to pursue their economic 
objectives without interference (Gwartney et al. 2011). We expect a greater variation in 
economic environments across countries than among regions within the same country, 
because (1) institutions that protect ownership and decision rights are established at the 
country level (La Porta et al. 1998), and (2) laws and regulations that limit the government’s 
capacity to intervene in corporate and private decisions are also enacted at the country level 
(Gwartney and Lawson 2003; Kreft and Sobel 2005). Economists at the Fraser Institute 
constructed an index of economic freedom that measures the extent of countries’ protection 
of property rights and ease of conducting business since the 1980s. Prior studies employing 
this index show that, across countries, greater economic freedom is associated with higher 
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investment growth and economic growth (Easton and Walker 1997; Dawson 1998; Gwartney 
et al. 2006). 
We define investment flexibility as a firm’s ability to adjust the amount of capital 
investment in response to its current or projected profitability. Managers’ freedom to adjust 
existing operations enhances equity value, because when they have such freedom, they can 
capitalize on favorable investment opportunities and limit losses from adverse market 
conditions as new information arrives (Myers 1977). Because current profitability informs 
managers about the desirability of future investment options (expansion, adaptation, or 
maintaining current operations), the firm’s future investment has a positive relation with 
current profitability (Biddle et al. 2001). Since a profitable firm’s future investment creates 
value and an unprofitable firm’s adaptation to alternative uses mitigates losses and thereby 
enhances value, equity value has a convex relation with profitability (Burgstahler and Dichev 
1997a; Zhang 2000). As greater economic freedom reduces friction and allows a firm to 
exercise these investment options, such freedom can enhance the firm’s future investment in 
response to current profitability (investment flexibility) and the degree of convexity of equity 
value with profitability.
1
 
Based on the above reasoning, we develop the following four hypotheses with regard to 
the effect of economic freedom on investment flexibility and equity value. In countries with 
greater economic freedom, we expect that (1) a firm’s capital investment in response to 
profitability is greater, (2) the relation between equity value and earnings (given equity book 
value) is more convex,
2
 (3) the relation between equity value and equity book value (given 
                                                 
1
 Realized investment is affected by the firm’s desire and ability to take advantage of investment opportunities. 
As further explained in the hypothesis development section below, we fix a firm’s investment rule (based on 
profitability) and assume that the firm follows the investment rule. A firm operating in a country with higher 
frictions and costs, i.e., low economic freedom, undertakes less investment in response to current profitability 
than it would if it were operating in a country with lower frictions and costs. Thus the firm’s realized investment 
manifests its ability to take advantage of investment opportunities. 
2
 The extent of economic freedom in a country may impact the degree of convexity in the relation between 
equity value and earnings (both scaled by equity book value) in that country. Our primary question, however, is: 
For firms where the growth/adaptation options are likely to be valuable, is the equity value attributable to those 
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earnings) is more convex, and (4) the relation between stock return (equity value change) and 
profitability change is more convex. Our empirical results are consistent with these four 
hypotheses, and the effects of economic freedom that we document are distinct from those of 
the GDP level and growth, legal origin, law enforcement, investor protection, and quality of 
accounting standards. Our results suggest that greater economic freedom enhances equity 
value by enhancing managers’ ability to exercise growth and adaptation options efficiently. 
Our study makes the following contributions. First, we extend previous studies with 
real-options-based valuation by taking into consideration the cross-country differences in 
economic freedom that affect management’s ability to make investment/divestment decisions 
in response to growth and adaptation opportunities. The empirical evidence also adds 
credibility to organizational design theory, which holds that organizational performance 
depends on the environment in which the firm operates (Roberts 2004).  
Second, we provide empirical evidence that economic institutions that protect managers’ 
decision rights enhance the value of active management. Our findings regarding the effect of 
economic freedom on value creation complement findings from prior studies on how 
institutions affect investment efficiency and equity value (e.g., Rajan and Zingales 1998b; La 
Porta et al. 2002). While prior studies emphasize the role of financial markets and take 
managerial decisions as given, our economic reasoning highlights the role of managerial 
decisions in creating value.  
Finally, our empirical results on the effects of economic freedom have implications for 
policy makers, investors, and researchers. For policy makers, our results suggest that 
increasing a country’s economic freedom can enhance corporate investment efficiency and 
equity value. For investors, valuation of equity using such accounting variables as earnings 
                                                                                                                                                        
options higher in countries with greater economic freedom? Therefore, we make comparisons across countries 
and define a country as having a more convex relation if the equity value attributable to growth (adaptation) 
options is higher in that country than in another, for firms with high (low) profitability. We define convexity in a 
similar manner when formulating and testing our research hypotheses. 
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and equity book value must take into consideration the economic environment that protects 
managers’ freedom to make investment decisions. This is particularly important when using 
multiples of earnings or equity book value to value the equity of firms across countries, given 
that our findings indicate that the multiples differ across countries. Researchers also need to 
be cautious when comparing the value relevance of accounting numbers across countries or 
financial-reporting regimes, because differences in the regression coefficients for earnings 
and book value of equity may be affected by economic factors, such as the extent of 
economic freedom, and accounting aspects, such as the quality of financial reporting 
standards. 
Next, Section II discusses related literature and develops research hypotheses. Section 
III lays out the research design and describes the sample. Section IV presents the empirical 
results and robustness checks. Section V concludes the paper. 
 
II. RELATED LITERATURE AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
Managerial decision rights and value creation 
Although the role of firms as the ultimate creators of value has long been acknowledged, 
a formal theory that recognizes managers’ role in allocating resources as the critical 
component of value creation has developed only over the past two decades. Important early 
contributions include those of Rajan and Zingales (1998a) and Holmström (1999), which 
highlight the importance of property rights and access to critical resources, such as human 
capital, in value creation. Roberts (2004, 104-105) explains the intuition: 
The firm’s control over access to resources … gives the firm power … to specify “the rules of the 
game.” … The point of doing so is to create value by making the firm an effective mechanism for 
coordination and motivation—a more effective mechanism than simple market relations. … [T]he 
central role for power harks back to the idea in the property rights literature that ownership is 
important because it conveys power. 
 
Aghion and Tirole (1997) initiated a related stream of literature that emphasizes the 
incentive effect of delegation, demonstrating that granting managers what they term real 
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authority over business decisions creates value for two reasons. First, having such real 
authority enables them to better utilize local knowledge, and second, this authority provides 
additional incentives to search for and adopt better solutions. Baker et al. (1999) extend 
Aghion and Tirole’s (1997) approach, and Newman and Novoselov (2009) apply it to 
accounting settings. The managerial economics literature demonstrates that giving managers 
power in the form of flexibility to make business decisions is the optimal way to maximize 
value, provided that appropriate safeguards against opportunism are in place. In summary, 
these studies imply that the value of management depends on whether and how 
management’s decision rights are protected and delegated in a given country.   
Researchers in accounting have developed real-options valuation models and provide 
important insights into the role of active management of investment options in value creation 
(Burgstahler and Dichev 1997a; Zhang 2000), but these valuation models do not consider 
frictions affecting firms’ ability to exercise growth/adaptation options. In practice, unlike 
financial options, the frictions and costs of exercising real options are non-trivial and may 
have considerable impacts on equity value (Zingales 2000). Some of these frictions and costs 
depend on the institutional environment of the country in which a firm operates.
3
 
Management’s decision rights over future investments, for example, could be hindered to 
varying degrees by legal restrictions, regulatory burdens, and government directives. In 
particular, some countries impose restrictions on capital flows and trade and regulate 
takeover activities, whereas other countries make it difficult for state-owned enterprises to lay 
off employees, sell assets, or declare bankruptcy. Furthermore, through corporate taxes, 
governments expropriate firms’ resources that could be deployed to finance investment and 
entrepreneurship activities (Djankov et al. 2010). The above-mentioned constraints on firms’ 
                                                 
3
 We focus on frictions and costs that are external to the firm and not under the firm’s control. In contrast, 
Berger et al. (1996) examine the (negative) impact of agency conflicts between management and shareholders 
on the value of adaptation options, and Jensen (1993) examines how agency conflicts delay the exercise of the 
exit option. 
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freedom to optimally adjust investments cause differences in equity value for the same 
earnings and equity book value across countries, holding everything else constant. In what 
follows, we employ a real-options-based valuation approach to analyze the effects of 
economic freedom on investment flexibility and equity value and develop testable hypotheses. 
Effect of economic freedom on the relation between capital investment and profitability  
Real-options-based valuation models view equity value as a function of future cash 
flows from existing assets in place and investment opportunities, which are represented by a 
set of real options (Burgstahler and Dichev 1997a, Zhang 2000). The underlying investment 
policy of the real-options-based valuation is that the firm will expand (growth option) or 
contract (adaptation option) its operations depending on future profitability. To the extent that 
current profitability is informative about future profitability, it affects the likelihood that 
those options will be exercised. As a result, equity value is a convex function of current 
profitability. While previous studies tend to presume that firms may freely exercise real 
options, in reality, many firms lack the freedom to exercise all available investment options. 
In this section, we illustrate how economic freedom affects investment flexibility.   
We follow Zhang’s (2000) framework, in which managers should allocate capital to 
investment opportunities to enhance value and current profitability guides managers’ 
investment decisions in the next period. Specifically, the firm anticipates the following 
investment options: (1) maintain the same scale of operations as those in the current period, 
(2) expand its operations by investing additional capital, and (3) discontinue or divest existing 
operations. To express the manager’s decision, the firm’s current-period profitability is 
defined as q = X/B, where X is current-period earnings and B is the corresponding equity 
book value (B > 0). Let qg* be the level of profitability above which the firm finds it optimal 
to exercise the growth option by adding capital, and let qa* be the level of profitability below 
which the firm finds it optimal to discontinue or divest existing operations by withdrawing 
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capital.
 
 If the firm’s profitability q is between qg* and qa*, the firm finds it optimal to 
maintain its existing operations. The firm’s decision rule on capital investment, I(q), in the 
above three scenarios can be expressed as: I(q) > 0, if q > qg*; I(q) < 0, if q < qa*; and I(q) = 
0, if  qa*  q  qg*.  
Since Zhang (2000) assumes no friction in exercising the growth and adaptation options, 
the firm in this model optimally exercises all investment options under the investment rule. 
More realistically, various government policies and institutions may interfere in the firm’s 
exercise of investment options. To illustrate the effect of economic freedom on the firm’s 
investment response to profitability, we express the amount of capital investment in the 
following equation: 
CI = f *B*I(q),                (1) 
where CI is the anticipated amount of capital investment/divestment, and f is the degree of 
economic freedom, ranging between zero and one, with higher f indicating greater freedom to 
adjust investments. B is the scale of existing operations, and we assume that 
investment/divestment increases with B. I(q) is capital investment normalized by existing 
book value of equity, following the previously defined decision rule.  
In Equation (1), given the investment rule based on current profitability q, a firm will 
want to optimally take all investment opportunities that satisfy the rule. The firm’s ability to 
take investment opportunities, and thus the realized investment, however, is affected by 
economic freedom. The lower the frictions and costs impeding the firm’s ability to undertake 
the desired investment (higher f), the greater is the firm’s investment in response to 
profitability (investment flexibility). This leads to our first hypothesis: 
H1: The relation of a firm’s capital investment to profitability is stronger in countries 
with greater economic freedom. 
Economic freedom and equity value attributable to the growth option 
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We now develop empirical predictions regarding the effect of economic freedom on the 
convex relations of equity value with profitability. Let V be the value of an equity-financed 
firm and k be the earnings capitalization factor. In the absence of economic frictions and costs 
of investment such that all investment options are fully exercised, and assuming unbiased 
accounting for depreciation, Zhang (2000, 2014) shows that equity value can be expressed as: 
V = B[P(q) + kq + C(q)] = BP(q) + kX + BC(q),       (2) 
where P(q) is the value of the (put) option to adapt/divest operations, and C(q) is the value of 
the (call) option to grow, both normalized by the scale measure, B. If the amount of capital 
investment is positively related to economic freedom, the corresponding equity value 
equation that incorporates economic freedom into the capital investment decision in (1) can 
be written as follows: 
V = B[fP(q) + kq + fC(q)] = fBP(q) + kX + fBC(q),                  (3) 
where f is a parameter that measures the degree of economic freedom, as in (1). 
As in Zhang (2000), we explore the effects of economic freedom on equity value 
attributable to growth options and adaptation options separately. We first focus on the effect 
of economic freedom on equity value attributable to growth options. By taking partial 
derivative of V with respect to X given B in Equation (3), we obtain: 
).(')(' qfCkqfP
BdX
dV
                      (4) 
Equation (4) shows that equity value is an increasing and convex function of 
profitability q or equivalently, earnings X given B. When profitability is too low or negative, 
operations are likely to be discontinued. It then follows that equity value (V) is determined by 
book value, and thus the relation between equity value and earnings is close to zero. As 
earnings (profitability) increase to a sufficiently high level, equity value increases, because 
the firm becomes more likely to expand its operations. As a result, given book value, equity 
value is determined mostly by whether and how growth options are exercised, and the value 
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of the adaptation option is irrelevant. In particular, equation (4) shows that parameter f 
(economic freedom) acts as an adjustment factor on the slope of equity value with respect to 
earnings, given equity book value.  
By taking a second derivative of Equation (4) with respect to X, we obtain: 
  .0)('')(''1 






qfCqfP
BdXBdX
dV
d         (5) 
Equation (5) shows that the slope change of equity value (V) with respect to earnings 
(given equity book value) increases with the firm’s freedom to exercise the growth option (f). 
Figure 1 shows the effect of economic freedom on the convexity of the equity value as a 
function of profitability q. The dotted linear line represents the value of a firm operating in a 
country without economic freedom (f = 0) and maintaining its current operations forever. 
Growth options are relevant for equity value for q > qg*, where qg* is the threshold of 
exercising the growth option, as defined above. If the firm operates in a country with 
economic freedom f > 0, equity value is an increasing and convex function of earnings, given 
equity book value. In contrast, if the firm operates in a country with economic freedom f0, 
where 0 < f0 < f, the firm’s equity value has a less convex relation with earnings, given equity 
book value, because the firm cannot undertake as much capital investment as it would in a 
country with more economic freedom, f. In the region where q < qg*, the value of growth 
options becomes irrelevant, and economic freedom has little effect on equity value 
attributable to growth. Furthermore, equity value is a linear function of earnings, given equity 
book value, if the firm maintains its current operations (qa*  q  qg*). The above analysis 
leads to our second hypothesis:
4
 
H2: The relation of a firm’s equity value to earnings, given equity book value, is more 
                                                 
4
 Our valuation model and research hypothesis do not take competition into consideration. Higher levels of 
profitability are likely to attract competition and subsequently become less sustainable, thereby weakening the 
convex relation between equity value and earnings, given book value of equity. If economic freedom has a 
strong positive correlation with competition, we are less likely to find results supporting the hypothesis that 
economic freedom enhances the convex relation between equity value and earnings, given book value of equity. 
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convex in countries with greater economic freedom. 
Economic freedom and equity value attributable to the adaptation option 
We explore the effect of economic freedom on equity value attributable to the 
adaptation option using a similar approach. To examine the relation between equity value (V) 
and equity book value (B), given earnings (X), we first take a partial derivative of V with 
respect to B in Equation (3):  
)()(')()(' qfCqfqCqfPqfqP
XdB
dV
           (6) 
Equation (6) shows that the impact of equity book value on equity value is also 
dependent on q, but the behavior is non-monotonic. When q is sufficiently low (either 
negative or small positive) and the put option is in the money while the call option is out of 
the money, the first two terms in Equation (6) dominate the last two, so that dV/dB is positive. 
When q is sufficiently high, the outcomes are the opposite, and dV/dB is negative.5 When the 
put option and the call option are both out of the money, dV/dB equals zero and equity value 
is a linear function of current earnings.  
Taking a second derivative of Equation (6) with respect to B yields: 
  .0)('')(''1 2 






qfCqfPq
BdBXdB
dV
d                    (7) 
Equation (7) shows that the slope of equity value with respect to book value, given 
earnings, increases with economic freedom (f). This result is illustrated in Figure 1. Given 
earnings (X), as q moves from qa* to its left, book value (B) increases, and equity value 
increases with a convex relation with book value. Furthermore, equity value has a more 
convex relation with book value (given earning) with greater economic freedom f than with f0. 
                                                 
5
 See Hao, Jin, and Zhang (2011) for a geometric view of the non-monotonic relation of equity value with book 
value, given earnings, in valuation model (2). 
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This is because the firm undertakes less than the desired amount of divestments in a country 
with less economic freedom. The above analysis leads to our third hypothesis:  
H3: The relation of a firm’s equity value to equity book value, given earnings, is more 
convex in countries with greater economic freedom. 
Economic freedom and stock return attributable to profitability change 
We develop two hypotheses on how economic freedom influences the convex relations 
of equity value with earnings and book value of equity based on analyses of Equation (3) and 
Figure 1. The analyses of Equations (4) and (5) also reveal that, given economic freedom f > 
0, equity value change is an increasing and convex function of profitability change. This 
increasing and convex function is documented in Chen and Zhang (2007), and we further 
consider the effect of economic freedom on this function. As Figure 1 reveals, for a given 
profitability change, an increase in economic freedom (from f0 to f) enhances the slope of 
equity value change, or stock return, so long as profitability change is within the region 
where growth options are most relevant. This is because when profitability is too low or 
negative, the firm will limit operating losses by adapting existing resources to alternative uses, 
and economic freedom facilitates the firm’s adaptation and leads to a greater value change for 
a given change of profitability. In contrast, when profitability is high, economic freedom 
facilitates the firm’s expansion, and similarly causes greater value change for a given change 
of profitability.
6
 The above analysis leads to our fourth hypothesis: 
H4: The relation of stock return with change of profitability is more convex in countries 
with greater economic freedom.  
 
III. RESEARCH DESIGN AND SAMPLE 
                                                 
6
 Similar to the reasoning in footnote no. 4, a large profitability change at an already high level of profitability 
may become unsustainable due to competition from within and outside of the country (Miller 1994; Burgstahler 
and Dichev 1997a; Fama and French 2000). We explore this potential effect of large profitability change in the 
empirical analysis. 
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Economic freedom and investment flexibility 
We perform the empirical analysis in two stages to test the first hypothesis on the 
positive relation between economic freedom and investment flexibility. In the first stage, we 
estimate the sensitivity of investment/divestment to profitability and use it as our measure of 
investment flexibility. For each country-year, we estimate the following regression of capital 
investment (CIt) on lagged profitability (PRt-1):  
CIt = γ0 + γ1PRt-1 + γ2D_NPRt-1 + γ3D_NPRt-1*PRt-1 + ·INDt + t,      (8) 
where capital investment equals the change in common equity, divided by the beginning 
common equity;
7
 profitability equals earnings before extraordinary items available for 
common shareholders, divided by average common equity; D_NPR is an indicator variable 
coded as one if PR is negative, and zero otherwise; IND is a set of indicator variables 
representing industry, based on classifications in Fama and French (1997); and  is a random 
disturbance term with zero mean. The subscripts denote time periods. Industry indicator 
variables are included to control for variation in capital investments across industries. 
Equation (8) includes D_NPR and D_NPR*PR to allow for potentially different responses of 
investments to profitability between profit firms and loss firms. We focus on the coefficient 
γ1, which we expect to be positive because it captures profit firms’ investment flexibility.  
In the second stage, we regress the estimate of γ1 in Equation (8) on the economic 
freedom index (EFI) of the corresponding country-year. The index, constructed by the Fraser 
Institute, is a comprehensive measure of the extent to which a given country’s institutions and 
policies are dedicated to personal choice, voluntary exchange, open markets, and clearly 
defined and enforced property rights. Specifically, the index incorporates 42 variables 
covering five areas: (1) size of government in terms of expenditures, taxes, and enterprises; (2) 
                                                 
7
 We measure capital investment by change in common equity when testing H1 because this is more in line with 
the subsequent tests on the relation between equity value (return) and profitability (change of profitability). If 
firms increase investment in response to profitability but finance the investment by debt, then share capital does 
not increase and we are less likely to find evidence supporting H1. The empirical results are similar when capital 
investment is measured by change in net operating assets and profitability is measured by return on assets.  
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legal structure and security of property rights; (3) access to sound money; (4) freedom to 
trade internationally; and (5) regulation of credit, labor, and business. Each variable is scored 
on a scale from 0 to 10 based on the distribution of the underlying data. The component 
ratings in each area are averaged to derive a rating for each of the five areas. In turn, the five 
area ratings are averaged to derive the summary rating for each country. Data used to 
construct each variable come from the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the 
World Economic Forum, and other independent sources. A higher score on the index 
indicates greater economic freedom. 
We hypothesize that investment flexibility increases with economic freedom, thus a 
positive coefficient on EFI in the regression of γ1. In the regression, we control for a set of 
potential confounding factors that could be associated with investment flexibility, including 
level and growth of GDP. To the extent that these two factors capture growth/adaptation 
opportunities in the economy, we expect investment flexibility to be higher in countries with 
higher GDP growth (GDPTH) and per capita GDP (LNGDP). The other potential 
confounding factors include legal origin, law and order, shareholders’ and creditors’ rights, 
level of ownership concentration in private firms, and quality of accounting standards, 
denoted by the six variables described below. COMMON is an indicator variable coded as 
one if the country has a common-law legal origin, and zero otherwise. LAW is the law-and-
order tradition in the country, based on an index constructed by International Country Risk, a 
country risk-rating agency. SHRI is an index for the shareholders’ anti-director rights in the 
country (Spamann 2010). DEBTRI is an index for creditors’ rights in the country (La Porta et 
al. 2008). OWNCON indicates ownership concentration, which equals the average percentage 
of common shares owned by the three largest shareholders in the country’s 10 largest 
nonfinancial, privately owned domestic firms (La Porta et al. 1998). ACC is an index that 
indicates the quality of a country’s accounting standards, as measured by inclusion or 
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omission of various items in annual reports (La Porta et al. 1998). See the Appendix for 
detailed variable definitions.  
We control for the above potential confounding variables in the regression, because a 
stream of finance research demonstrates that investment efficiency and firm value are 
positively associated with deepening financial markets, which in turn rely on strong investor 
protection through enforcement of securities laws and disclosures (Rajan and Zingales 1998b; 
Wurgler 2000; La Porta et al. 2002, 2006). In addition, because law, enforcement, and 
investor protection influence the extent of a country’s economic freedom, it is important to 
control for them to ensure that the effect of economic freedom is over and above the effects 
of these confounding factors. We have no predictions for the results of these control variables, 
however, because they are identified primarily based on prior research that examines 
investment efficiency and firm value and the focus of our study is investment flexibility and 
the value of growth/adaptation options. For completeness, we also run the regression of γ1 + 
γ3 (for loss firms), even though we have no prediction for the sign of the coefficient on EFI. 
Economic freedom and the convex relation between equity value and earnings, given 
book value of equity 
To test H2, we also use a two-stage approach. First, following Burgstahler and Dichev 
(1997a), and consistent with Equation (2), we use earnings scaled by book value of equity as 
a proxy for the potential value of growth options and estimate the following regression by 
country-year: 
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where MV equals market value of equity, BV equals book value of equity, E equals earnings 
before extraordinary items available for common shareholders, and IND is a set of indicator 
variables representing industry, as defined in Equation (8). The subscripts denote time 
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periods, and thus Et/BVt-1 indicates profitability.
8
 For each country-year, we divide firms into 
three groups based on the sign and ranking of Et/BVt-1: negative, positive-high, and positive-
low, where the latter two groups are separated by the median of positive Et/BVt-1 in the 
country-year.
9
 GN is an indicator variable coded as one if the firm’s Et/BVt-1 is negative (i.e., a 
loss firm, since our sample excludes firms with negative lagged or current BV), and zero 
otherwise. GH is an indicator variable coded as one if the firm’s Et/BVt-1 is positive-high, and 
zero otherwise. We use this grouping because the value of the growth option is a convex 
function of earnings, given book value of equity (Burgstahler and Dichev 1997a; Biddle et al. 
2001; Hao et al. 2011), and the valuation of loss firms is distinct from that of profit firms.
10
 
We predict the coefficient on Et/BVt-1 to increase with the level of profitability (i.e., α3 < α3 + 
α5). For loss firms, the growth option is irrelevant, but the adaptation option becomes relevant. 
If firms with more negative profitability have a higher probability of adaptation and 
turnaround (Collins et al. 1997), the coefficient α3 + α4 could be negative. 
In the second stage, we regress the coefficients for Et/BVt-1 in Equation (9), including α3, 
α3 + α4, and α3 + α5, on EFI of the corresponding country-year. To ensure that the result 
captures the effect of economic freedom rather than other institutional factors, we control for 
several confounding factors that could be associated with the value of growth options 
obtained in the first stage. First, we control for the mean profitability of the respective group 
(negative, positive-low, or positive-high) in the country-year. This is to ensure that the 
variation of the coefficient on EFI across the three regressions is not due to differences 
among α3, α3 + α4, and α3 + α5 that are driven by different average profitability across 
                                                 
8
 Burgstahler and Dichev (1997a) use a similar model without a distinction between profit and loss firms, but 
they do not interpret earnings divided by book value of equity as profitability. Zhang (2000) uses a similar 
valuation model and provides a theoretical basis for incorporating profitability into the model. 
9
 The regression results are similar when the high- and low-groups in Equations (9) to (12) are separated by the 
median of positive values of firms in all countries and years. 
10
 The level of profitability to trigger a firm’s adaptation is likely to depend on firm characteristics. Loss appears 
to signal a significantly “worse” managerial performance than small profit, which prompts managers to avoid it 
by managing earnings. Collins et al. (1999) find that for negative earnings, book value explains equity value due 
to its proxy for future normal earnings and for the adaptation option. 
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countries and years. Second, we control for GDP growth (GDPTH), per-capita GDP 
(LNGDP), and institutional factors (COMMON, LAW, SHRI, DEBTRI, OWNCON, and ACC), 
as previously defined, for reasons similar to those when we test the hypothesized relation 
between economic freedom and investment flexibility in H1. We have no predictions for the 
results of these control variables, however, because prior research studies the relationships of 
these institutional factors with firm value or equity value, but not with the convex relation 
between equity value and earnings, given book value of equity. 
In the test of H2, we focus on firms with high Et/BVt-1, because the convex relation 
between equity value and earnings, given equity book value, is driven mainly by this group. 
If the relation for the high-Et/BVt-1 group is more convex in countries with greater economic 
freedom, the coefficient on Et/BVt-1 in Equation (9) for the group would increase with 
economic freedom, thus yielding a positive coefficient on EFI in the regression of α3 + α5. 
We do not have a prediction for the result from the regression of α3, because the value of 
growth option is less important for low-Et/BVt-1 firms. For loss firms, as the adaptation option 
becomes more relevant, the coefficient on EFI in the regression of α3 + α4 could be negative 
(i.e., economic freedom enhances loss firms’ ability to exercise the adaptation option and 
turnaround). 
Economic freedom and the convex relation between equity value and book value of 
equity, given earnings 
To test H3, we use an approach similar to that for testing H2. In the first stage, we 
estimate the following equation by country-year to examine the relation between equity 
market value and book value: 
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where MV, BV, and E are defined as in the previous analyses. Both MV and BV are scaled by 
earnings, E, to control for the value of the growth option. For each country-year, we divide 
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firms into three groups based on the sign and ranking of BVt/Et: negative, positive-high, and 
positive-low, where the latter two groups are separated by the median of positive BVt/Et in 
the country-year. DN is an indicator variable coded as one if the firm’s BVt/Et is negative, due 
to negative earnings, and zero otherwise. DH is an indicator variable coded as one if the 
firm’s BVt/Et is positive-high, and zero otherwise.  
We do the partition in Equation (10) because the value of the adaptation option is more 
relevant to equity valuation when earnings are lower (i.e., higher BVt/Et, given positive 
earnings) and the value of the adaptation option is an increasing and convex function of 
BVt/Et (Burgstahler and Dichev 1997a; Biddle et al. 2001; Hao et al. 2011). We separate loss 
firms from low-BVt/Et firms, because there is a discontinuity in the distribution of BVt/Et 
around zero. BVt/Et increases as earnings decrease toward zero, but it drops to a large 
negative value when earnings fall just below zero. We expect the coefficient on BVt/Et to 
increase with BVt/Et for profit firms (i.e., β3 < β3 + β5). For loss firms, where the adaptation 
option becomes relevant, we expect a positive relation between equity value and book value 
of equity, given earnings, and thus positive β3 + β4. 
In the second stage, we regress the coefficients for BVt/Et obtained in the first stage, 
including β3, β3 + β4, and β3 + β5, on EFI of the corresponding country-year. In the regression, 
we control for the mean BVt/Et of each respective group (positive-low, negative, or positive-
high) in the country-year, for a reason similar to that for controlling for the group’s mean 
profitability when testing H2. We also control for the effects of GDP level and growth and 
other institutional factors, which are the same as those in the second stage of the analysis 
when testing H2. 
In testing H3, we focus on the group with high BVt/Et, because the convex relation 
between market value and book value of equity, given earnings, is driven mainly by this 
group of firms. If the relation for the high-BVt/Et group is more convex in countries with 
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greater economic freedom, the coefficient on BVt/Et in Equation (10) for the group would 
increase with economic freedom, thus yielding a positive coefficient on EFI in the regression 
of β3 + β5. We do not have a prediction for the coefficient on EFI in the regression of β3, 
because the adaptation option is less relevant when BVt/Et is low, i.e., earnings are high, 
given book value of equity. For loss firms, if the adaptation option is more relevant to equity 
value when losses are greater (β3 + β4 > 0), the coefficient on EFI in the regression of β3 + β4 
would be positive, to the extent that economic freedom enhances the relationship between 
equity value and the value of the adaptation option. 
Economic freedom and the convex relation between stock return and profitability 
change 
To test H4, we use a two-stage approach similar to that for testing H2. In the first stage, 
we estimate a model based on Chen and Zhang (2007) to examine the convex relation 
between stock return (equity value change) and profitability change by country-year. Chen 
and Zhang (2007) document the convex relation for a sample of U.S. firms, and we expect a 
similar result for our cross-country sample. The model is as follows: 
Rt = δ0 + δ1GNt + δ2GHt + δ3Δqt + δ4GNt*Δqt + δ5GHt*Δqt + δ6xt + δ7Δbt + ·INDt  
     + t,                    (11) 
where Rt equals annual stock return; Δqt equals change in profitability (Et/BVt-1 - Et-1/BVt-2), 
multiplied by beginning book value of equity over beginning equity value (BVt-1/MVt-1); xt 
equals earnings divided by beginning equity value (Et/MVt-1); and Δbt equals change in book 
value of equity divided by beginning equity ((BVt - BVt-1)/BVt-1), multiplied by (1 - BVt -1/MVt-
1). The above three variables are as defined in Chen and Zhang (2007). GN, GH, and IND are 
defined previously. To the extent that all profitability changes are sustainable, we expect the 
coefficient on Δqt to increase with profitability for profit firms (i.e., δ3 < δ3 + δ5). For loss 
 19 
firms, the growth option is less relevant, but if those with a greater decline in profitability 
have a higher probability of adaptation and turnaround, δ3 + δ4 could be negative. 
In the second stage, we regress the coefficients for Δqt obtained in the first stage, 
including δ3, δ3 + δ4, and δ3 + δ5, on EFI of the corresponding country-year and the same 
control variables as in the second-stage analysis when testing H2, except that the mean of the 
group’s Et/BVt-1 is replaced by the mean of Δqt.  
In the test of H4, we focus on firms with high profitability, because the convex relation 
between stock return and change of profitability is driven mainly by this group of firms. If the 
relation for the high-profitability group is more convex in countries with greater economic 
freedom, the coefficient on Δqt in Equation (11) for the group would increase with economic 
freedom, thus yielding a positive coefficient on EFI in the regression of δ3 + δ5. We do not 
have a prediction for the result from the regression of δ3, because the value of the growth 
option is less important for low-profitability firms. For loss firms, the growth option is less 
relevant, and we do not have a prediction for the coefficient on EFI. If δ3 + δ4 is negative, 
however, the coefficient on EFI could be negative, based on a reasoning similar to the one we 
use in the regression of α3 + α4. 
Data Sources and Sample 
We collect an economic freedom index for each country and year from the Fraser 
Institute.
11
 For U.S. firms, stock-return data are from CRSP and the remaining financial data 
are from Compustat. For non-U.S. firms, stock-return data are from Datastream, and other 
financial data are from Worldscope. GDP growth and per-capita GDP data are from the 
International Macroeconomic Data Set, available from the Economic Research Service of the 
U.S. Department of Agriculture. Data on institutional factors (legal origin, law and order, 
                                                 
11
 The Heritage Foundation in the United States also publishes an index of economic freedom since 1994. Hanke 
and Walters (1997) show that the correlation coefficient between the index from the Fraser Institute and the 
index from the Heritage Foundation equals 0.85. We follow most prior studies published in academic journals 
and use the Fraser Institute’s index. 
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shareholders’ and creditors’ rights, ownership concentration, and quality of accounting 
standards) are from La Porta et al. (1998, 2008), Spamann (2010), and International Country 
Risk, a country risk-rating agency. We exclude firms with negative book value of equity, so 
that the sign of profitability, q, is determined by the sign of earnings. We also exclude small 
firms, defined as either the book value or the market value of equity being less than five 
million U.S. dollars equivalent at year-end, and country-years that have less than 100 firms. 
The final sample includes 194,996 firm-year observations from 30 countries for the 2000–
2010 period.
12
  
Table 1 presents the summary of descriptive statistics of variables by country. Panel A 
shows the country-level variables, including legal origin, law and order, shareholders’ rights, 
creditors’ rights, ownership concentration, and quality of accounting standards. Forty percent 
of the countries in the sample have a common-law legal origin, and Brazil and Philippines 
have the lowest law-and-order index. Panel A also shows the mean of the country-year-level 
variables, including the economic freedom index, GDP growth, and per-capita GDP, over the 
sample years by country. Turkey and Brazil have the lowest means of the economic freedom 
index (6.03 and 6.14, respectively), while Hong Kong and Singapore have the highest means 
(8.89 and 8.64, respectively). There is a large variation in the mean GDP growth rate over the 
sample period, ranging from 0.04 percent for Italy to 5.79 percent for India.  
Panel B of Table 1 shows the mean of each firm-year-level variable over the sample 
period by country.
13
 The mean of capital investment growth (CIt) is positive for all countries, 
ranging from 8.1 percent (Japan) to 28.7 percent (Australia). The mean of profitability (PRt-1) 
                                                 
12
 This is the sample size in the test of H2. The sample sizes in other tests differ slightly due to missing data on 
certain financial variables. The sample period starts from 2000, because the Fraser Institute’s index was updated 
only once every five years between 1980 and 2000. 
13
 The continuous firm-year-level variables are winsorized at the 5
th
 and 95
th
 percentiles to reduce the influence 
of extreme values on the regression coefficients. We require a country-year to have at least 100 firms at the 
beginning of the sample-selection process. Five country-years that satisfy this requirement have less than 100 
firms remaining (ranging from 90 to 99) after imposing the data requirements, but we retain them in the sample. 
The regression results are similar and the conclusions are unaffected when these five country-years are dropped. 
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ranges from 2.2 percent (Canada) to 22.4 percent (South Africa). The mean of market-to-
book value of equity (MVt/BVt) ranges from 1.56 (South Korea) to 3.21 (Sweden). The mean 
of current profitability (Et/BVt-1) ranges from 1 percent (Canada) to 20 percent (South Africa). 
The mean of MVt/Et ranges from 5.46 (Australia) to 19.87 (Greece). The mean of BVt/Et 
ranges from 3.48 (Australia) to 16.30 (Japan). The mean of annual stock return has a wide 
distribution, ranging from 2.3 percent for Greece to 50.1 percent for Brazil. Most countries 
experience a decline in mean profitability over the prior year (Δqt), but the range is relative 
small, from -1.9 percent for Italy to 0.4 percent for Chile.  
 
IV. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Economic freedom and investment flexibility 
Table 2 presents the results for testing H1, the hypothesized relation between economic 
freedom and investment flexibility. Panel A presents the summary result for Equation (8), 
first stage of the analysis, where capital investment (CI) is regressed on profitability (PR) by 
country-year. The mean of γ1, our measure of managerial investment flexibility for profit 
firms, equals 0.845 (t = 26.46). The mean of γ1 + γ3 equals -0.772 (t = -6.94), which indicates 
that for loss firms, a greater loss is associated with greater subsequent capital investment.
14
 
Panel A also shows that the results are similar when capital investment is measured by 
change in net operating assets and profitability is measured by return on assets. 
Panel B of Table 2 presents the results from the regression of γ1 on economic freedom, 
EFI.15 The regression also controls for differences in the level and growth of GDP and 
                                                 
14
 One possible explanation for this result is that a loss may signal worse-than-expected performance to the 
firm’s stakeholders, thereby acting as a catalyst for the manager to increase investments to turn around the firm 
(Burgstahler and Dichev 1997b). Similarly, managers may be reluctant to exit or divest until firm performance 
deteriorates significantly (Jensen 1993). Another possible explanation is that loss firms overstate expenses 
deliberately, a big bath approach, and then subsequently reverse them, causing an increase in equity.    
15
 We compute t-statistics of all regression coefficients based on standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity 
and with two-way clustering on country and year, and p-values based on two-tailed tests. The regression results 
are similar when we run a weighted-least-squares regression, where the weights are inversely proportional to the 
standard errors on the coefficients estimated in the first stage. 
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institutional factors (legal origin, law and order, shareholders’ rights, creditors’ rights, 
ownership concentration, and quality of accounting standards) across countries. Column (1) 
shows that the coefficient on EFI equals 0.249 (t = 2.30). Multiplying this coefficient by the 
inter-quartile range of EFI (= 1.026) gives 0.255, which suggests that moving EFI from the 
first quartile to the third quartile increases the mean γ1 by about 30 percent (= 0.255/0.845). 
This result shows evidence of a positive association between economic freedom and 
investment flexibility, which is consistent with H1. Column (1) also shows that investment 
flexibility is positively associated with GDP growth and negatively associated with a law-
and-order tradition. Column (3) shows that when capital investment is measured by change in 
net operating assets and profitability is measured by return on assets, the coefficient on EFI 
equals 0.266 (t = 2.57), consistent with the result in Column (1). 
Although not a focus of our study, we also run a regression of γ1 + γ3 on EFI and 
present the coefficients in Column (2) in Panel B of Table 2. The coefficient on EFI is not 
significantly different from zero. The coefficients on GDPTH, LNGDP, and SHRI are 
significantly negative, and the coefficients on COMMON and LAW are significantly positive. 
Although the sign of each of these five coefficients on control variables is opposite to that of 
the corresponding coefficient in Column (1), the results are not inconsistent, because a more 
negative dependent variable in Column (2) implies larger investment growth in response to 
greater loss. Column (4) shows that the coefficient on EFI is not significantly different from 
zero when capital investment is measured by change in net operating assets and profitability 
is measured by return on assets. 
Economic freedom and the convex relation between equity value and earnings, given 
equity book value    
Table 3 presents the results for testing H2, the hypothesized relation between economic 
freedom and the convex relation between equity value and earnings given book value of 
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equity. Panel A presents the summary result for Equation (9), first stage of the analysis, 
where equity value is regressed on earnings by country-year and both variables are scaled by 
book value of equity. The mean estimate of α3 and α3 + α5 equals 4.808 (t = 18.16) and 13.643 
(t = 45.04), respectively, and α3 + α5 is significantly greater than α3 (p < 0.001, F-value not 
tabulated), consistent with a convex relation between equity value and the value of growth 
options. The result is similar when the comparison is based on medians. These results are 
consistent with previous findings in Burgstahler and Dichev (1997a) based on U.S. data.  
The mean estimate of α3 + α4 equals -4.002 (t = -14.01), suggesting that for loss firms, 
more negative profitability is associated with higher equity value. One interpretation for this 
result is that the greater the loss, the more managers are pressured to find better ways of 
utilizing assets, which can include redesigning or repositioning the product, streamlining the 
product line, or finding a new market. 
Panel B of Table 3 presents the results from the regression of α3, α3 + α4, and α3 + α5, 
obtained in the first-stage regression for firms with positive-low, negative, and positive-high 
profitability, respectively. Column (1) shows that when the dependent variable is α3, where 
the value of growth options is relatively small, the coefficient on EFI equals 1.315 (t = 1.41). 
The result indicates a positive but statistically insignificant association between economic 
freedom and equity value attributable to growth options for firms with small profitability. 
Among the control variables, only DEBTRI (creditors’ rights) is associated with α3 
(coefficient = -0.959 and t = -3.70). Column (2) shows that when the dependent variable is α3 
+ α4, the coefficient on EFI equals -1.521 (t = -1.65). The result suggests that for loss firms, 
economic freedom is not statistically significantly associated with equity value that is 
attributable to the value of growth options. The coefficient on the mean Et/BVt-1 of this group 
is significantly positive, which indicates that it is important to control for the extent of 
profitability across groups when comparing results among different regressions. Similar to 
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the result in Column (2) of Table 2, Panel B, for loss firms, the coefficients on GDPTH and 
LNGDP are significantly negative and the coefficient on LAW is significantly positive. 
Column (3) in Panel B of Table 3 shows that when the dependent variable is α3 + α5, 
where the value of growth options is greater, the coefficient on EFI equals 1.239 (t = 1.73, p 
= 0.085). The result indicates a positive association between economic freedom and equity 
value attributable to growth options for firms with high profitability, which is consistent with 
H2.
16
 Multiplying the coefficient for EFI in Column (3) by the inter-quartile range of 1.026 
for EFI gives 1.271, which suggests that moving EFI from the first quartile to the third 
quartile would increase the mean α3 + α5 by 9.3 percent (= 1.271/13.643). The coefficient on 
the mean Et/BVt-1 of this high-profitability group is significantly positive. 
Economic freedom and the convex relation between equity value and book value of 
equity, given earnings 
Table 4 presents the results for testing H3, the hypothesized relation between economic 
freedom and equity value attributable to the adaptation option. Panel A presents the summary 
results for Equation (10), the first stage of the analysis, where equity market value is 
regressed on equity book value by country-year to estimate the value of the adaptation option. 
The mean of β3 equals 0.425 (t = 7.12), and the mean of β3 + β5 equals 1.076 (t = 69.54). The 
mean of β3 + β5 is significantly greater than the mean of β3 (p < 0.001, F-value not tabulated). 
Similarly, the median of β3 + β5 is significantly greater than the median of β3. These results 
are consistent with our expectations, as well as previous findings in Burgstahler and Dichev 
(1997a) based on U.S. data. The mean estimate of β3 + β4 equals 1.032 (t = 54.02), which 
suggests that a loss firm’s equity value is greater if its book value of equity is greater, given 
negative earnings.  
                                                 
16
 As discussed in footnote no. 2, we interpret a significantly positive coefficient on EFI in the regression of α3 + 
α5 as evidence supporting H2. It is not necessary for the coefficient on EFI to be greater in the regression of α3 + 
α5 than in the regression of α3 to support H2. 
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Panel B of Table 4 presents the results from the regression of β3, β3 + β4, and β3 + β5, 
obtained in the first stage, when BVt/Et is positive-low, negative, and positive-high, 
respectively. Column (1) shows that when the dependent variable is β3, where the value of the 
adaptation option is relatively small, the coefficient on EFI is not significantly different from 
zero. The coefficients on LAW, DEBTRI, OWNCON, and ACC are significantly positive, and 
the coefficients on LNGDP and SHRI are significantly negative. Column (2) shows that when 
the dependent variable is β3 + β4 (loss firms), the coefficient on EFI is not significantly 
different from zero. The coefficients on Mean(BVt/Et) and GDPTH are significantly positive, 
and the coefficient on SHRI is significantly negative.  
Column (3) in Panel B of Table 4 shows that when the dependent variable is β3 + β5, 
where the value of the adaptation option is relatively large, the coefficient on EFI equals 
0.062 (t = 2.30). Multiplying this coefficient by the inter-quartile range of EFI (= 1.026) 
gives 0.064, which suggests that moving EFI from the first to the third quartile would 
increase the mean β3 + β5 by about 6 percent (= 0.064/1.076). The result provides evidence 
supporting H3.
17
 
Economic freedom and the convex relation between stock return and profitability 
change  
Table 5 presents the results for testing H4, the hypothesized impact of economic 
freedom on the relation between stock return and profitability change. Panel A presents the 
summary result for Equation (11), the first stage of the analysis, where annual stock return is 
regressed on profitability change, earnings scaled by equity value, and change in equity book 
value, by country-year. The mean (median) of 3 for the group with positive-low profitability 
equals 0.510 (0.485), and the mean (median) of 3 + 5 for the group with positive-high 
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 The coefficient for Mean(BV/E) in Column (3) is significantly negative, which suggests that given high BV/E 
(based on the rankings within a country-year), the relation between market value and book value of equity is less 
convex if the overall BV/E is higher. One explanation for this result is that when a country-year has higher 
average BV/E (i.e., lower profitability), its general economic environment is unfavorable, making it more 
difficult for high-BV/E firms to exercise the adaptation option. 
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profitability equals 0.525 (0.542). On average, 3 + 5 is greater than 3, but the difference is 
not statistically significant at conventional levels. The mean of 3 + 4 equals -0.257 (t = -
3.93), suggesting that for loss firms, a greater decline in profitability over the prior year is 
associated with a higher stock return. The negative mean of 3 + 4 is consistent with the 
result for the negative mean of α3 + α4 in Panel A of Table 3.  
Panel B of Table 5 presents the results from the regression of 3, 3 + 4, and 3 + 5, 
obtained in the first stage when profitability is positive-low, negative, and positive-high, 
respectively. Column (1) shows that in the regressions of 3, the coefficient on EFI equals 
0.236 (t = 3.28). Column (3) shows that in the regressions of 3 + 5, the coefficient on EFI 
equals 0.308 (t = 4.62). These results indicate that economic freedom enhances profit firms’ 
stock-price movements that are attributable to changes in profitability, regardless whether the 
profitability is high or low. Column (2) shows that in the regression of 3 + 4 (loss firms), the 
coefficient on EFI equals -0.320 (t = -2.72). Since 3 + 4 is negative, on average, a negative 
coefficient on EFI indicates that economic freedom strengthens the association between 
greater profitability declines and higher stock returns, as documented in Panel A of Table 5. 
Collectively, the results in Table 5 show that the relation between stock return and 
profitability change varies with economic freedom. But the relation is not convex when a 
firm’s profitability moves from positive-low to positive-high. We conjecture that this result 
may be influenced by firms with an increase in profitability so large that it brings profitability 
to an unsustainable level, which attenuates the otherwise would-be convex relation (among 
profit firms). To investigate this explanation, we separate firms in the high-profitability group 
in Equation (11) into two categories: those with a very large increase in profitability (top-ten 
percent) and the rest. We first estimate the following equation: 
Rt = δ0 + δ1GNt + δ2GHt + δ3Δqt + δ4GNt*Δqt + δ5GHt*Δqt + δ5aGHt*Δqt*D10  
+ δ5bD10 + δ6xt + δ7Δbt + ·INDt + t,        (12) 
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where D10 is an indicator variable coded as one if the firm’s Δqt is at the top-ten percent of 
the high-profitability group in the country-year, and zero otherwise. All other variables are 
defined the same as in previous sections. Then, we run regressions of 3, 3 + 4, 3 + 5, and 
3 + 5 + 5a, obtained from the regression of Equation (12), on EFI and control variables.  
Panel A of Table 6 shows the regression result of Equation (12). The mean (median) of 
3 equals 0.511 (0.489), and the mean (median) of 3 + 5 equals 0.620 (0.618). The mean and 
median of 3 + 5 are both significantly greater than the mean and median of 3 (p = 0.086 
and 0.067, respectively, based on two-tailed tests). The mean of 3 + 5 + 5a is not 
significantly different from zero. These results reveal a convex relation between stock return 
and change in profitability, except when the latter is extremely large.  
Panel B of Table 6 presents the results from the regressions of 3, 3 + 4, 3 + 5, and 3 
+ 5 + 5a on EFI and the control variables. The results in Columns (1) and (2) for the 
regressions of 3 and 3 + 4 are similar to those in the corresponding columns in Table 5, 
Panel B, which is expected. Column (3) shows that in the regression of 3 + 5, for firms in 
the high-profitability group but not among the top-ten percent of profitability increase, the 
coefficient on EFI equals 0.535 (t = 3.23). This coefficient is much greater than the 
coefficient on EFI for the entire high-profitability group (= 0.308, in Column (3) of Table 5, 
Panel B). Column (4) shows that in the regression of 3 + 5 + 5a, the coefficient for EFI is 
not significantly different from zero. Taken together, the results in Table 6 show a convex 
relation between stock return and change in profitability, except when the profitability change 
is very large, and the relation is more convex in countries with greater economic freedom. 
Robustness checks 
In the primary analyses, we do not run a regression for the pooled sample that includes 
all countries and years. This is because the independent variables would include one Et/BVt-1 
(or BVt/Et) for each of the negative, positive-low, and positive-high group and their 
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interaction effects with the economic freedom index, as well as eight control variables and 
their interaction effects with Et/BVt-1 (or BVt/Et) for each of the three groups, which would 
make the analysis very complicated. Nevertheless, as robustness checks, we perform the 
following two sets of pooled regression analyses, which drop the interaction effects between 
the eight control variables and the three groups of Et/BVt-1 (or BVt/Et): 
MVt/BVt-1 = α0 + GLt*[α1(Et/BVt-1) + α2EFIt*(Et/BVt-1)] + GNt*[β0 + β1(Et/BVt-1)  
+ β2EFIt*(Et/BVt-1)] + GHt*[γ0 + γ1(Et/BVt-1) + γ2EFIt*(Et/BVt-1)]  
+ δEFIt + λ·CONTROLt + ·INDt + t,                (13) 
MVt/Et = α0 + DLt*[α1(BVt/Et) + α2EFIt*(BVt/Et)] + DNt*[β0 + β1(BVt/Et)  
+ β2EFIt*(BVt/Et)] + DHt*[γ0 + γ1(BVt/Et) + γ2EFIt*(BVt/Et)]  
+ δEFIt + λ·CONTROLt + ·INDt + t,                (14) 
where GL (DL) is an indicator variable coded as one if the firm belongs to the group of 
positive-low Et/BVt-1 (BVt/Et) and zero otherwise, and CONTROL is a set of eight control 
variables that are in the regressions in Panel B of Tables 3 and 4. All other variables are 
defined as in previous sections. For ease of interpreting the coefficients, EFI in the pooled 
regression is scaled to range between zero and one. The variables of interest are EFI*(Et/BVt-1) 
for the high-Et/BVt-1 group in Equation (13) and EFI*(BVt/Et) for the high-BVt/Et group in 
Equation (14).
18
 
We first estimate Equations (13) and (14) without the interaction terms EFI*(Et/BVt-1) 
and EFI*(BVt/Et). The results are presented in Columns (1) and (3) of Table 7. In both 
columns, the coefficients α1, β1, and γ1 are all significantly different from zero, and γ1 is 
significantly greater than α1 (p < 0.01, t-values not shown). These results are consistent with 
the results in Panel A of Tables 3 and 4, and confirm the convex relations of equity value 
with earnings, given equity book value, and with equity book value, given earnings.  
Next, we estimate the full equations (13) and (14), and the results are presented in Table 
                                                 
18
 The regression results for the interaction effects EFIt*(Et/BVt-1) (or EFIt*(BVt/Et)) are unaffected when we 
divide the main effect of EFI into three, one for each group of Et/BVt-1 (or BVt/Et). 
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7, Columns (2) and (4), respectively. Column (2) shows that α2, the coefficient on 
EFI*(Et/BVt-1) for the group with positive-low profitability, equals -0.786 (t = -0.42), and γ2, 
the coefficient on EFI*(Et/BVt-1) for the group with positive-high profitability, equals 4.521 (t 
= 2.18). These two results are consistent with those reported in Table 3, Panel B and support 
H2. Column (2) also shows that β2 equals -6.234 (t = -3.28). This result, together with the 
significantly negative β1 in Column (1), indicates that for loss firms, equity value is higher if 
Et/BVt-1 is more negative, and the relation is stronger in countries with greater economic 
freedom. 
Turning to the results for Equation (14), Column (4) of Table 7 shows that α2, the 
coefficient on EFI*(BVt/Et) for the group with positive-low BVt/Et, equals 1.108 (t = 2.65), 
and γ2, the coefficient on EFI*(BVt/Et) for the group with positive-high BVt/Et, equals 0.400 (t 
= 2.14). These two results provide evidence consistent with H3.
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 Column (4) also shows that 
β2 equals 0.570 (t = 1.80). This result, together with the significantly positive β1 in Column 
(3), indicates that the equity value of loss firms that is attributable to the book value of equity 
is greater when the loss is greater (i.e., BVt/Et is less negative) and that this relation is 
stronger in countries with greater economic freedom. 
To further disentangle the effect of economic freedom from the effects of other 
institutional variables, we replicate all regressions after replacing EFI by the residual 
obtained from the regression of EFI on GDPTH, LNGDP, COMMON, LAW, SHRI, DEBTRI, 
OWNCON, and ACC (estimated by country-year). The regression residual of EFI captures the 
economic freedom index that is not explained by the eight institutional factors. The results 
(not tabulated) are similar to those presented in the tables. 
 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
                                                 
19
 Although γ2 is smaller than α2 in Column (4) of Table 7, the convex relation between equity value and BVt/Et 
still holds since α1 is negative and γ1 is positive. 
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This paper provides empirical evidence from a cross-country study on the effects of 
economic freedom on a firm’s capital investment response to profitability and on the 
relation between equity value and accounting profitability. Employing the real-options-
based valuation approach, we hypothesize that in a country with greater economic freedom, 
(1) the firm’s capital investment response to profitability is higher, (2) equity value and 
earnings or book value of equity have a more convex relation when the firm’s profitability 
is such that the value of growth options or adaptation options is of greater relevance, and (3) 
stock return and profitability change have a more convex relation. Using the index of 
economic freedom from the Fraser Institute, we test our hypotheses with data from 30 
countries during the 2000–2010 period. The empirical results support these hypotheses and 
suggest that greater economic freedom enhances equity value through more efficient 
exercise of investment options. 
Our study contributes to the real-options-based valuation literature by incorporating 
institutional factors that affect the frictions and costs of exercising real options. While our 
study focuses on cross-country comparisons, future research could investigate differences 
in firm characteristics, such as financial constraints and management quality, that may 
affect firms’ ability to effectively utilize growth and adaptation opportunities. Our study 
also has implications for valuation research in an international setting (Bhojraj et al. 2003). 
Our empirical results suggest that international equity valuation using accounting-based 
multiples should select peer firms that are matched on not only firm-specific factors but 
also institutional characteristics, such as economic freedom. Finally, our results indicate 
that the different relations between accounting numbers and equity value across countries 
or financial reporting regimes can result from differences in economic environments, such 
as protection of managers’ freedom to make investment decisions, and not just differences 
in the quality of accounting information or standards.  
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Appendix 
Definitions of Variables 
 
Country-level variables 
COMMON An indicator variable coded as one if the legal origin of the company law or 
commercial code of the country is English common law, and zero otherwise. 
Source: La Porta et al. (1998). 
LAW Assessment of the country's law-and-order tradition. The variable equals the 
average index during the sample period from 2000 to 2010. Source: International 
Country Risk (ICR, a country risk-rating agency). 
SHRI An index measuring the antidirector rights of shareholders in the country. The 
index is formed by adding one when: (1) the country allows shareholders to mail 
their proxy vote; (2) shareholders are not required to deposit their shares prior to 
the General Shareholders’ Meeting; (3) cumulative voting or proportional 
representation of minorities on the board of directors is allowed; (4) an oppressed 
minorities mechanism is in place; (5) the minimum percentage of share capital that 
entitles a shareholder to call for an Extraordinary Shareholders’ Meeting is less 
than or equal to 10%; or (6) when shareholders have preemptive rights that can 
only be waived by a shareholders’ meeting. The index ranges from 0 (weak 
antidirector rights) to 5 (strong antidirector rights). The index was constructed by 
La Porta et al. (1998) and revised by Djankov et al. (2008) and Spamann (2010). 
Source: Spamann (2010). 
DEBTRI An index measuring creditors’ rights. The index is formed by adding one when: (1) 
the country imposes restrictions, such as creditors’ consent or minimum dividends, 
to file for reorganization; (2) secured creditors are able to gain possession of their 
security once the reorganization petition has been approved (no automatic stay); 
(3) secured creditors are ranked first in the distribution of the proceeds that result 
from the disposition of a bankrupt firm's assets; (4) the debtor does not retain the 
administration of its property pending the resolution of the reorganization. The 
index ranges from 0 (weak creditor rights) to 4 (strong creditor rights). Source: La 
Porta et al. (2008), available from http://scholar.harvard.edu/shleifer/publications/ 
economic-consequences-legal-origins. 
OWNCON The average percentage of common shares owned by the top three shareholders in 
the 10 largest nonfinancial, privately owned domestic firms in a given country. A 
firm is considered privately owned if the state is not a known shareholder in it. 
Source: La Porta et al. (1998). 
ACC An index measuring the quality of a country’s accounting standards. The index is 
created by examining and rating companies’ annual reports on their inclusion or 
omission of 90 items. These items fall into seven categories, including general 
information, income statements, balance sheets, funds flow statements, accounting 
standards, stock data, and special items. A higher score on the index indicates 
higher quality of accounting standards. Source: La Porta et al. (1998). 
Country-year-level variables 
EFI Economic Freedom Index for the country and year. Source: 
www.freetheworld.com. 
GDPTH Real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth for the country and year. Source: 
Economic Research Service’s International Macroeconomic Data Set. 
LNGDP Natural logarithm of real per-capita GDP for the country and year. Source: 
Economic Research Service’s International Macroeconomic Data Set. 
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Firm-year-level variables (Sources: Compustat, CRSP, Datastream, and Worldscope)  
CIt Capital investment in year t, which equals change in book value of equity, scaled 
by beginning book value of equity. 
PRt-1 Profitability for year t-1, which equals earnings before extraordinary items 
available for common shareholders, scaled by average book value of equity. 
MVt/BVt-1 Market value of common equity at the end of year t, divided by the beginning book 
value of equity. 
Et/BVt-1 Earnings before extraordinary items available for common shareholders for year t, 
scaled by the beginning book value of equity. 
MVt/Et Market value of common equity at the end of year t, scaled by earnings before 
extraordinary items available for common shareholders for year t. 
BVt/Et Book value of common equity at the end of year t, scaled by earnings before 
extraordinary items available for common shareholders for year t. 
Rt Cumulative stock return over year t. 
Δqt Change in profitability in year t (= Et/BVt-1  Et-1/BVt-2), multiplied by the 
beginning book value of equity/beginning market value of equity. 
xt Earnings before extraordinary items available for common shareholders for year t, 
scaled by the beginning market value of equity. 
Δbt Change in book value of equity in year t scaled by beginning book value of equity, 
and multiplied by (1 – beginning book value of equity/beginning market value of 
equity). 
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Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics of Variables 
 
Panel A: Country- and country-year level variables  
 
Country-level 
Country-year level  
(Number of years and  
mean of variable) 
Country COMMON LAW SHRI DEBTRI OWNCON ACC N EFI GDPTH LNGDP 
Australia  1 1.76 4.0 3 0.28 75 11 8.14 1.89 10.54 
Brazil  0 -0.33 5.0 1 0.57 54 10 6.14 1.91 8.45 
Canada  1 1.73 4.0 1 0.40 74 11 8.27 1.35 10.45 
Chile  0 1.27 4.0 2 0.45 52 8 7.85 2.86 8.91 
Denmark  0 1.92 4.0 3 0.45 62 10 7.88 0.51 10.76 
Finland  0 1.94 3.5 1 0.37 77 10 7.82 1.92 10.53 
France  0 1.41 3.0 0 0.34 69 10 7.36 0.78 10.42 
Germany  0 1.65 2.5 3 0.48 62 10 7.64 0.93 10.43 
Greece  0 0.77 2.0 1 0.67 55 10 7.05 3.12 10.01 
Hong Kong  1 1.45 5.0 4 0.54 69 11 8.89 3.76 10.15 
India  1 0.08 5.0 2 0.40 57 11 6.48 5.79 6.64 
Israel  1 0.90 4.0 3 0.51 64 5 7.25 2.39 9.96 
Italy  0 0.49 2.5 2 0.58 62 10 7.11 0.04 10.31 
Japan  0 1.27 3.5 1 0.18 65 11 7.71 0.97 10.47 
Korea  0 0.91 3.5 3 0.23 62 11 7.23 4.12 9.77 
Malaysia  1 0.50 5.0 3 0.54 76 11 6.75 2.88 8.58 
Netherlands  0 1.75 3.0 3 0.39 64 8 7.92 1.81 10.57 
New Zealand  1 1.84 4.0 4 0.48 70 2 8.45 1.31 10.22 
Norway  0 1.91 3.5 2 0.36 74 10 7.46 1.43 11.08 
Philippines  0 -0.49 3.0 1 0.57 65 8 6.87 2.34 7.04 
Singapore  1 1.61 5.0 3 0.49 78 11 8.64 3.53 10.22 
South Africa  1 0.09 5.0 3 0.52 70 11 6.95 2.65 8.56 
Spain  0 1.17 5.0 2 0.51 64 10 7.49 1.18 10.14 
Sweden  0 1.87 3.5 1 0.28 83 10 7.53 1.79 10.60 
Switzerland  0 1.86 3.0 1 0.41 68 10 8.29 1.13 10.82 
Taiwan  0 0.88 3.0 2 0.18 65 10 7.58 2.95 9.64 
Thailand  1 0.06 4.0 2 0.47 64 10 6.63 3.33 7.88 
Turkey  0 0.06 2.0 2 0.59 51 10 6.03 2.24 8.75 
UK  1 1.67 5.0 4 0.19 78 11 8.27 1.13 10.52 
USA 1 1.55 3.0 1 0.20 71 11 8.20 0.83 10.64 
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Panel B: Firm-year level variables (number of observations and mean of variable) 
Country N CI PR MVt/BVt-1 Et/BVt-1 MVt/Et BVt/Et R Δq x Δb 
Australia  8,320 0.287 0.025 3.19 0.02 5.46 3.48 0.233 -0.004 -0.001 0.127 
Brazil  1,543 0.204 0.127 3.07 0.12 16.92 8.91 0.501 -0.005 0.080 0.044 
Canada  8,935 0.226 0.022 2.91 0.01 8.34 5.00 0.241 -0.004 -0.000 0.107 
Chile  860 0.105 0.129 1.91 0.12 13.99 10.57 0.345 0.004 0.082 0.035 
Denmark  1,581 0.120 0.094 2.15 0.07 12.62 8.59 0.195 -0.017 0.043 0.047 
Finland  1,149 0.112 0.124 2.50 0.10 12.78 7.12 0.198 -0.017 0.042 0.053 
France  5,873 0.184 0.117 2.70 0.09 15.89 9.58 0.154 -0.012 0.041 0.077 
Germany  5,973 0.171 0.075 2.68 0.04 14.41 8.50 0.120 -0.017 0.008 0.073 
Greece  2,518 0.114 0.089 2.25 0.07 19.87 13.69 0.023 -0.017 0.021 0.071 
Hong Kong  7,455 0.220 0.084 2.18 0.07 10.60 9.61 0.274 -0.009 0.046 0.051 
India  5,924 0.236 0.196 3.06 0.18 14.46 8.36 0.425 -0.002 0.104 0.091 
Israel  1,326 0.173 0.123 2.04 0.11 8.82 6.52 0.304 -0.005 0.058 0.059 
Italy  2,417 0.141 0.068 2.44 0.04 17.17 11.09 0.075 -0.019 0.013 0.044 
Japan  33,072 0.081 0.051 1.67 0.04 18.50 16.30 0.081 -0.007 0.023 0.036 
Korea  10,204 0.158 0.063 1.56 0.05 10.14 11.19 0.232 -0.012 0.053 0.023 
Malaysia  7,471 0.086 0.068 1.34 0.06 12.67 12.89 0.119 -0.010 0.050 0.024 
Netherlands  909 0.182 0.145 2.93 0.13 13.68 7.48 0.189 -0.008 0.057 0.106 
New Zealand  190 0.152 0.131 2.26 0.09 13.49 9.30 0.097 -0.018 0.046 0.068 
Norway  1,560 0.224 0.063 2.77 0.05 10.05 6.65 0.228 -0.002 0.032 0.090 
Philippines  982 0.158 0.078 1.67 0.08 14.65 13.55 0.295 0.001 0.068 0.041 
Singapore  4,838 0.163 0.123 1.94 0.11 12.57 10.80 0.224 -0.014 0.062 0.046 
South Africa  2,376 0.251 0.224 2.70 0.20 10.00 6.58 0.249 -0.017 0.112 0.095 
Spain  1,188 0.124 0.135 2.78 0.12 17.95 10.39 0.163 -0.013 0.049 0.065 
Sweden  2,640 0.201 0.078 3.21 0.06 11.43 5.50 0.195 -0.005 0.020 0.098 
Switzerland  2,098 0.102 0.091 2.29 0.08 15.26 9.85 0.148 -0.007 0.041 0.045 
Taiwan  9,836 0.093 0.089 1.78 0.07 14.56 11.03 0.246 -0.006 0.032 0.045 
Thailand  3,407 0.129 0.119 1.70 0.11 11.05 9.65 0.242 -0.012 0.080 0.029 
Turkey  1,879 0.274 0.115 2.23 0.10 11.22 8.14 0.320 -0.009 0.063 0.087 
UK  12,025 0.217 0.071 3.06 0.04 10.42 6.29 0.130 -0.011 0.009 0.108 
USA 46,451 0.138 0.057 2.88 0.04 14.46 7.63 0.129 -0.010 0.010 0.087 
 
See Appendix for variable definitions.  
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 Table 2 
Summary of Regression Results for Investment Flexibility and Economic Freedom  
 
 
Panel A: Summary results for the regression of capital investment on profitability by country-year 
 N Mean t-stat. Std dev. Quartile 1 Median Quartile 3 
Model: CIt = 0 + 1PRt-1 + 2D_NPRt-1 + 3D_NPRt-1*PRt-1 + ·INDt + t 
0 292 0.066 4.19 0.271 -0.088 0.027 0.164 
1 292 0.845 26.46 0.546 0.502 0.805 1.143 
2 292 -0.026 -2.18 0.205 -0.082 -0.030 0.028 
3 292 -1.617 -13.49 2.049 -2.149 -1.321 -0.836 
1 + 3 292 -0.772 -6.94 1.902 -1.159 -0.508 -0.204 
Adjusted R
2
 292 0.139 24.16 0.099 0.086 0.134 0.181 
 
Model: CIAt = 
A
0 + 
A
1PR
A
t-1 + 
A
2D_NPR
A
t-1 + 
A
3D_NPR
A
t-1*PR
A
t-1 + 
A·INDt + t 
0 292 0.075 7.68 0.166 -0.028 0.046 0.149 
1 292 0.695 22.76 0.522 0.444 0.677 0.944 
2 292 -0.033 -5.34 0.105 -0.066 -0.031 -0.001 
3 292 -0.940 -12.26 1.310 -1.456 -0.864 -0.349 
1 + 3 292 -0.245 -3.62 1.156 -0.635 -0.149 -0.239 
Adjusted R
2
 292 0.090 17.55 0.088 0.044 0.087 0.130 
 
Panel B: Results for the regression of investment flexibility on economic freedom and other variables 
(Dependent variable = Estimate of 1, 1 + 3, 
A
1, and 
A
1 + 
A
3 in the regressions in Panel A) 
 Dependent Variable = 
 1 1 + 3 
A
1 
A
1 + 
A
3 
Independent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Intercept -2.430
**
 5.634
***
 -1.740 1.560 
 (-2.02) (2.70) (-1.63) (0.71) 
EFI 0.249** -0.059 0.266** 0.117 
 (2.30) (-0.37) (2.57) (1.63) 
GDPTH 0.053*** -0.120** 0.027* -0.017 
 (5.18) (-2.03) (1.92) (-0.28) 
LNGDP 0.152 -0.546** -0.011 -0.256 
 (1.41) (-2.15) (-0.12) (-1.20) 
COMMON -0.117 0.400*** -0.204 -0.011 
 (-1.05) (3.44) (-1.64) (-0.20) 
LAW -0.446** 0.570** -0.286* 0.171 
 (-2.28) (2.55) (-1.85) (0.62) 
SHRI 0.009 -0.384*** -0.034 -0.111 
 (0.15) (-3.05) (-0.69) (-1.54) 
DEBTRI 0.045 0.102 0.055 0.025 
 (0.86) (1.23) (1.21) (0.30) 
OWNCON -0.707 -0.983 -0.555** -0.530 
 (-1.53) (-1.15) (-2.15) (-0.83) 
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ACC 0.008 0.007 0.017** 0.004 
 (0.77) (0.45) (2.04) (0.42) 
Number of observations  292 292 292 292 
Adjusted R
2
 (%) 14.72 3.32 14.72 3.32 
 
See the Appendix for variable definitions. CI (CIA) equals capital investment, measured by change in common 
equity (net operating assets). PR (PRA) equals profitability, measured by the rate of return on common equity 
(total assets). D_NPR (D_NPRA) is an indicator variable coded as one if PR (PRA) is negative and zero otherwise. 
IND is a set of indicator variables that represent industry. Panel A presents summary statistics of the coefficient 
estimates of ’s and A’s for 292 country-year-specific regressions. The sample consists of 186,423 firm-year 
observations from 30 countries for the 2000–2010 period. Panel B presents the results for regression of 
investment flexibility in a country-year (1, 1 + 3, 
A
1, and 
A
1 + 
A
3 obtained in the regressions in Panel A) on 
economic freedom and other variables. t-statistics, presented in parentheses below the coefficients, are 
computed based on standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity and with two-way clustering on country and 
year. 
***
, 
**
, and 
*
 indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively, based on two-
tailed tests. 
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Table 3 
Summary of Regression Results for Equity Value Attributable to Growth Options and 
Economic Freedom 
 
Panel A: Summary results for the regression of market value of equity on earnings by country-year 
Model: tt
t
t
H
t
t
N
t
t
HN
t
t IND
BV
E
G
BV
E
G
BV
E
GG
BV
MV
εαααααα
1
5
1
4
1
3210
1


  
 N Mean t-stat. Std. dev. Quartile 1 Median Quartile 3 
α0 292 0.990 14.98 1.129 0.425 0.872 1.439 
α1 292 -0.130 -2.83 0.786 -0.453 -0.102 0.128 
α2 292 -1.441 -19.84 1.241 -2.034 -1.183 -0.667 
α3 292 4.808 18.16 4.525 2.198 4.542 7.013 
α3 + α4 292 -4.002 -14.01 4.881 -6.367 -2.920 -0.666 
α3 + α5 292 13.643 45.04 5.176 10.071 13.313 16.681 
Adjusted-R
2
 292 0.418 54.08 0.132 0.340 0.413 0.495 
 
Panel B: Results for the regression of equity value attributable to the growth option on economic 
freedom and other variables (Dependent variable = estimate of α3, α3 + α4, and α3 + α5 in the 
regression in Panel A) 
Independent variable 
Dependent Variable = 
α3 α3 + α4 α3 + α5 
(1) (2) (3) 
Intercept 0.838 27.172
***
 -12.969 
 (0.12) (3.42) (-1.07) 
EFI 1.315 -1.521 1.239* 
 (1.41) (-1.65) (1.73) 
MEAN(Et/BVt-1) 10.842 25.684
***
 31.975
***
 
 (1.42) (2.71) (4.67) 
GDPTH 0.022 -0.420*** 0.243 
 (0.23) (-3.04) (1.42) 
LNGDP -0.385 -1.714*** 1.450 
 (-0.70) (-3.50) (1.59) 
COMMON -0.452 -1.157 0.412 
 (-0.62) (-1.50) (0.35) 
LAW 0.325 3.466*** -2.240 
 (0.35) (3.24) (-1.47) 
SHRI 0.846* -0.379 0.451 
 (1.73) (-1.07) (0.84) 
DEBTRI -0.959*** 0.263 -0.163 
 (-3.70) (1.01) (-0.36) 
OWNCON -1.538 -0.749 -4.929 
 (-0.70) (-0.28) (-1.57) 
ACC -0.056 0.009 -0.036 
 (-1.42) (0.19) (-0.55) 
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Number of observations  292 292 292 
Adj.-R
2
 (%) 3.54 14.88 17.88 
 
See the Appendix for variable definitions. GN is an indicator variable coded as one if the firm has negative 
Et/BVt-1 and zero otherwise. GH is an indicator variable coded as one if the firm’s Et/BVt-1 is above the median of 
the positive values in the country-year, and zero otherwise. IND is a set of indicator variables that represent 
industry. Panel A presents summary statistics of the coefficient estimates for 292 country-year-specific 
regressions. The sample consists of 194,996 firm-year observations from 30 countries for the 2000–2010 period. 
Panel B presents the results for the regression of the association between MVt/BVt-1 and Et/BVt-1 in a country-
year (α3, α3 + α4, and α3 + α5 obtained in the regression in Panel A) on economic freedom and other variables. 
Mean(Et/BVt-1) in Panel B equals the mean of Et/BVt-1 for firms in the country-year and indicated group of 
Et/BVt-1 (negative, positive-low, or positive-high). t-statistics, presented in parentheses below the coefficients, 
are computed based on standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity and with two-way clustering on country 
and year. 
***
, 
**
, and 
*
 indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively, based on 
two-tailed tests. 
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Table 4 
Summary of Regression Results for Equity Value Attributable to Adaptation Options and 
Economic Freedom 
 
Panel A: Summary results for the regression of market value of equity on book value of equity by 
country-year:  
Model: tt
t
t
H
t
t
N
t
t
HN
t
t IND
E
BV
D
E
BV
D
E
BV
DD
E
MV
  543210  
 N Mean t-stat. Std. dev. Quartile 1 Median Quartile 3 
β0 292 9.619 17.91 9.175 4.706 8.737 13.711 
β1 292 -13.266 -27.83 8.144 -17.852 -12.167 -7.645 
β2 292 -6.590 -15.04 7.488 -10.288 -6.750 -2.717 
β3 292 0.425 7.12 1.019 0.092 0.490 0.817 
β3 + β4 292 1.032 54.02 0.326 0.830 0.991 1.249 
β3 + β5 292 1.076 69.54 0.264 0.888 1.063 1.244 
Adjusted-R
2
 292 0.752 108.57 0.118 0.704 0.780 0.830 
 
Panel B: Results for the regression of equity value attributable to the adaptation option on economic 
freedom and other variables (dependent variable = estimate of β3, β3 + β4, and β3 + β5 in the regression 
in Panel A) 
Independent variable 
Dependent Variable = 
β3 β3 + β4 β3 + β5 
(1) (2) (3) 
Intercept 2.058
**
 0.911
*
 -0.118 
 (2.06) (1.78) (-0.40) 
EFI -0.197 0.018 0.062** 
 (-1.13) (0.32) (2.30) 
MEAN(BVt/Et) 0.051 0.016
*
 -0.014
***
 
 (0.86) (1.73) (-3.36) 
GDPTH 0.009 0.031** 0.001 
 (0.45) (2.50) (0.06) 
LNGDP -0.230** 0.011 0.107*** 
 (-2.06) (0.40) (4.77) 
COMMON 0.119 0.011 -0.039** 
 (0.53) (0.44) (-2.56) 
LAW 0.610*** 0.018 -0.158*** 
 (2.77) (0.35) (-3.16) 
SHRI -0.495*** -0.054** -0.060*** 
 (-4.61) (-2.15) (-4.00) 
DEBTRI 0.110* -0.008 0.006 
 (1.71) (-0.35) (0.52) 
OWNCON 0.808** 0.096 0.214* 
 (2.18) (0.56) (1.88) 
ACC 0.035*** 0.002 0.005*** 
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 (3.79) (0.53) (3.95) 
Number of observations  292 292 292 
Adj.-R
2
 (%) 17.63 7.42 23.12 
 
See the Appendix for variable definitions. DN is an indicator variable coded as one if the firm has negative 
BVt/Et and zero otherwise. DH is an indicator variable coded as one if the firm’s BVt/Et is above the median of 
the positive values in the country-year, and zero otherwise. IND is a set of indicator variables that represent 
industry. Panel A presents summary statistics of the coefficient estimates for 292 country-year-specific 
regressions. The sample consists of 194,955 firm-year observations from 30 countries for the 2000–2010 period. 
Panel B presents the results for the regression of the association between MVt/Et and BVt/Et in a country-year (β3, 
β3 + β4, and β3 + β5 obtained in the regression in Panel A) on economic freedom and other variables. 
Mean(BVt/Et) in Panel B equals the mean of BVt/Et for firms in the country-year and the indicated group of 
BVt/Et (negative, positive-low, or positive-high). t-statistics, presented in parentheses below the coefficients, are 
computed based on standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity and with two-way clustering on country and 
year. 
***
, 
**
, and 
*
 indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively, based on two-
tailed tests. 
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Table 5 
Summary of Regression Results for Stock Return Attributable to Profitability Change and 
Economic Freedom 
 
Panel A: Summary results for the regression of annual stock return on profitability change, earnings, 
and change in book value of equity by country-year  
Model: Rt = δ0 + δ1GN + δ2GH + δ3Δqt + δ4GN*Δqt + δ5GH*Δqt + δ6xt + δ7Δbt + ·INDt + t 
 N Mean t-stat. Std. dev. Quartile 1 Median Quartile 3 
δ0 292 0.055 2.09 0.447 -0.198 0.019 0.272 
δ1 292 0.070 4.54 0.265 -0.072 0.045 0.165 
δ2 292 0.063 11.20 0.096 0.015 0.064 0.111 
δ3 292 0.510 13.85 0.629 0.128 0.485 0.883 
δ 3 + δ4 292 -0.257 -3.93 1.117 -0.508 -0.085 0.216 
δ3 + δ5 292 0.525 11.52 0.778 0.114 0.542 0.987 
δ6 292 1.252 23.40 0.914 0.582 1.135 1.801 
δ7 292 0.123 6.92 0.305 -0.050 0.101 0.280 
Adjusted-R
2
 292 0.259 33.64 0.132 0.172 0.245 0.343 
 
Panel B: Results for the regression of the return-profitability change relationship on economic 
freedom and other variables (dependent variable = estimate of δ3, δ3 + δ4, and δ3 + δ5 in the regression 
in Panel A) 
Independent variable 
Dependent Variable = 
δ3 δ3 + δ4 δ3 + δ5 
(1) (2) (3) 
Intercept 0.474 3.572
***
 0.929 
 (0.67) (3.37) (1.36) 
EFI 0.236*** -0.320*** 0.308*** 
 (3.28) (-2.72) (4.62) 
MEAN(Δqt) 3.749*** 3.032 1.381* 
 (2.76) (1.48) (1.82) 
GDPTH -0.006 -0.044* -0.018 
 (-0.57) (-1.71) (-0.97) 
LNGDP -0.060 -0.143 -0.027 
 (-0.54) (-1.30) (-0.33) 
COMMON 0.054 0.410*** 0.165** 
 (0.90) (5.82) (2.45) 
LAW -0.176 0.324** -0.255 
 (-1.35) (2.54) (-1.36) 
SHRI -0.069 -0.296** -0.149*** 
 (-1.39) (-2.35) (-2.86) 
DEBTRI -0.055** 0.082 -0.009 
 (-2.47) (1.42) (-0.23) 
OWNCON -1.018*** -0.980** -1.845*** 
 (-3.32) (-1.99) (-3.38) 
ACC -0.002 0.017 -0.013*** 
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 (-0.70) (1.15) (-3.48) 
Number of observations  292 292 292 
Adj.-R
2
 (%) 10.12 7.93 10.69 
 
See the Appendix for variable definitions. GN is an indicator variable coded as one if the firm has negative 
Et/BVt-1 and zero otherwise. GH is an indicator variable coded as one if the firm’s Et/BVt-1 is above the median of 
the positive values in the country-year, and zero otherwise. IND is a set of indicator variables that represent 
industry. Δ denotes change over the previous year. Panel A presents summary statistics of the coefficient 
estimates based on 292 country-year-specific regressions. The sample consists of 175,286 firm-year 
observations from 30 countries during the 2000–2010 period. Panel B presents the results for the regression of 
the association between annual stock return and profitability change (δ3, δ3 + δ4, and δ3 + δ5 obtained in the 
regression in Panel A) on economic freedom and other variables. Mean(Δqt) in Panel B equals the mean of Δqt 
for firms in the country-year and the indicated group of Et/BVt-1 (negative, positive-low, or positive-high). t-
statistics, presented in parentheses below the coefficients, are computed based on standard errors adjusted for 
heteroskedasticity and with two-way clustering on country and year. 
***
, 
**
, and 
*
 indicate statistical significance 
at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively, based on two-tailed tests. 
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Table 6 
Summary of Regression Results for Stock Return Attributable to Profitability Change and 
Economic Freedom 
 
Panel A: Summary results for the regression of annual stock return on profitability change, earnings, 
and change in book value of equity by country-year  
Model: Rt = δ0 + δ1GNt + δ2GHt + δ3Δqt + δ4GNt*Δqt + δ5GHt*Δqt + δ5aD10t*Δqt + δ5bD10t + δ6xt 
       + δ7Δbt + ·INDt + t 
 N Mean t-stat. Std. dev. Quartile 1 Median Quartile 3 
δ0 292 0.054 2.05 0.451 -0.213 0.016 0.270 
δ1 292 0.068 4.46 0.261 -0.070 0.042 0.166 
δ2 292 0.063 11.06 0.097 0.018 0.064 0.111 
δ3 292 0.511 13.79 0.633 0.146 0.489 0.890 
δ4 292 -0.772 -11.65 1.133 -1.128 -0.621 -0.212 
δ5 292 0.109 1.72 1.083 -0.542 0.094 0.796 
δ5a 292 0.935 0.81 19.772 -1.319 -0.033 1.455 
δ5b 292 0.035 0.09 6.355 -0.170 0.000 0.135 
δ6 292 1.245 23.09 0.921 0.588 1.161 1.816 
δ7 292 0.125 6.59 0.325 -0.044 0.105 0.279 
δ 3 + δ4 292 -0.261 -3.99 1.117 -0.488 -0.091 0.197 
δ3 + δ5 292 0.620 10.38 1.021 0.043 0.618 1.197 
δ3 + δ5 + δ5a 292 1.555 1.34 19.853 -0.632 0.465 1.810 
Adjusted-R
2
 292 0.265 34.17 0.132 0.173 0.254 0.346 
 
Panel B: Results for the regression of the return-profitability change relationship on economic 
freedom and other variables (dependent variable = estimate of δ3, δ3 + δ4, δ3 + δ5, and δ3 + δ5 + δ5a in 
the regression in Panel A) 
Independent variable 
Dependent Variable = 
δ3 δ3 + δ4 δ3 + δ5 δ3 + δ5 + δ5a 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Intercept 0.347 3.247
***
 0.723
*
 -28.122 
 (0.51) (3.30) (1.74) (-0.84) 
EFI 0.242*** -0.310*** 0.535*** -0.726 
 (3.48) (-2.84) (3.23) (-0.33) 
MEAN(Δqt) 3.701*** 2.996 1.309 -21.180*** 
 (2.72) (1.49) (1.56) (-4.83) 
GDPTH -0.006 -0.046* 0.027 0.103 
 (-0.51) (-1.73) (1.18) (0.30) 
LNGDP -0.053 -0.130 -0.072 3.093 
 (-0.49) (-1.19) (-0.63) (1.21) 
COMMON 0.042 0.401*** -0.104 -1.555 
 (0.69) (5.64) (-0.57) (-0.62) 
LAW -0.192 0.290** -0.398* -1.810 
 (-1.48) (2.55) (-1.95) (-0.31) 
SHRI -0.058 -0.286** -0.138** 0.009 
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 (-1.16) (-2.22) (-2.51) (0.01) 
DEBTRI -0.060*** 0.077 0.003 1.435 
 (-2.65) (1.30) (0.04) (1.46) 
OWNCON -1.027*** -0.984* -2.606*** 7.504 
 (-3.28) (-1.92) (-3.23) (1.14) 
ACC -0.002 0.019 -0.021** 0.101 
 (-0.64) (1.22) (-2.40) (1.41) 
Number of observations  292 292 292 292 
Adj.-R
2
 (%) 9.94 7.95 12.61 3.26 
 
See the Appendix for variable definitions. GN is an indicator variable coded as one if the firm has negative 
Et/BVt-1 and zero otherwise. GH is an indicator variable coded as one if the firm’s Et/BVt-1 is above the median of 
the positive values in the country-year, and zero otherwise. Δ denotes change over the previous year. D10 is an 
indicator variable coded as one if the firm’s Δqt is among the top ten percent in the high-profitability group in 
the country-year, and zero otherwise. IND is a set of indicator variables that represent industry. Panel A presents 
summary statistics of the coefficient estimates based on 292 country-year-specific regressions. The sample 
consists of 175,286 firm-year observations from 30 countries during the 2000–2010 period. Panel B presents the 
results for the regression of the association between annual stock return and profitability change (δ3, δ3 + δ4, δ3 + 
δ5, and δ3 + δ5 + δ5a in the regression in Panel A) on economic freedom and other variables. Mean(Δqt) in Panel 
B equals the mean of Δqt for firms in the country-year and indicated group of Et/BVt-1 (negative, positive-low, or 
positive-high). t-statistics, presented in parentheses below the coefficients, are computed based on standard 
errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity and with two-way clustering on country and year. 
***
, 
**
, and 
*
 indicate 
statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively, based on two-tailed tests. 
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Table 7 
Summary of Results from the Pooled Regression of Market Value of Equity on Earnings or 
Book Value of Equity, Economic Freedom, Interaction Effects between Economic Freedom and 
Earnings or Book Value of Equity, and Control Variables 
 
MVt/BVt-1 = α0 + GLt*[α1(Et/BVt-1) + α2EFIt*(Et/BVt-1)] + GNt*[β0 + β1(Et/BVt-1) + β2EFIt*(Et/BVt-1)]  
+ GHt*[γ0 + γ1(Et/BVt-1) + γ2EFIt*(Et/BVt-1)] + δEFIt + λ·CONTROLt + ·INDt + t 
MVt/Et = α0 + DLt*[α1(BVt/Et) + α2EFIt*(BVt/Et)] + DNt*[β0 + β1(BVt/Et) + β2EFIt*(BVt/Et)]  
+ DHt*[γ0 + γ1(BVt/Et) + γ2EFIt*(BVt/Et)]  + δEFIt + λ·CONTROLt + ·INDt + t 
 
 
Coefficient 
Dependent Variable = 
MVt/BVt-1 MVt/Et 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
α0 -0.734 -0.171 16.304** 18.925** 
 (-0.51) (-0.13) (2.10) (2.43) 
α1 7.695*** 8.143*** 0.500*** -0.203 
 (8.14) (4.83) (7.95) (-0.84) 
α2  -0.786  1.108*** 
  (-0.42)  (2.65) 
β0 -0.066 -0.039 -15.259
***
 -14.814
***
 
 (-0.65) (-0.43) (-8.27) (-8.61) 
β1 -4.643
***
 -0.173 0.919
***
 0.543
**
 
 (-3.79) (-0.17) (18.50) (2.51) 
β2  -6.234
***
  0.570
*
 
  (-3.28)  (1.80) 
γ0 -1.101
***
 -1.115
***
 -4.674
***
 -4.598
***
 
 (-4.92) (-4.85) (-6.53) (-5.94) 
γ1 14.878
***
 11.898
***
 0.936
***
 0.676
***
 
 (14.31) (6.78) (16.84) (5.13) 
γ2  4.521
**
  0.400
**
 
  (2.18)  (2.14) 
δ -0.254 -0.996** -1.939 -7.074*** 
 (-0.49) (-2.15) (-0.77) (-2.65) 
CONTROL and IND Included Included Included Included 
Number of observations 194,996 194,996 194,955 194,955 
Adjusted R
2
 (%) 64.84 64.99 77.41 77.63 
 
See the Appendix for variable definitions. GL (GH) is an indicator variable coded as one if the firm’s Et/BVt-1 is 
below (above) the median of the positive values in the country-year, and zero otherwise. GN is an indicator 
variable coded as one if the firm has negative Et/BVt-1, and zero otherwise. DL (DH) is an indicator variable 
coded as one if the firm’s BVt/Et is below (above) the median of the positive values in the country-year, and zero 
otherwise. DN is an indicator variable coded as one if the firm has negative BVt/Et, and zero otherwise. EFI is 
scaled to range between zero and one. CONTROL is a set of control variables, including GDPTH, LNGDP, 
COMMON, LAW, SHRI, DEBTRI, OWNCON, and ACC. IND is a set of indicator variables that represent 
industry. t-statistics, presented in parentheses below the coefficients, are computed based on standard errors 
adjusted for heteroskedasticity and with two-way clustering on country and year. The results for CONTROL and 
IND are not presented. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively, 
based on two-tailed tests. 
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Figure 1 
Economic Freedom and the Relation between Equity Value and Earnings, Given Equity Book 
Value 
 
 
 
 
 
 
